The Clash of Civilizations

The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order
Author	Samuel P. Huntington
Publisher	Simon & Schuster
Publication date	1996
ISBN	0-684-84441-9
OCLC Number	38269418

The Clash of Civilizations is a theory, proposed by political scientist Samuel P. Huntington, that people's cultural and religious identities will be the primary source of conflict in the post-Cold War world.

The theory was originally formulated in a 1992 lecture^[1] at the American Enterprise Institute, which was then developed in a 1993 Foreign Affairs article titled "The Clash of Civilizations?",^[2] in response to Francis Fukuyama's 1992 book, The End of History and the Last Man. Huntington later expanded his thesis in a 1996 book The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order.

The term itself was first used by Bernard Lewis in an article in the September 1990 issue of The Atlantic Monthly titled "The Roots of Muslim Rage".^[3]

This expression derives from clash of cultures, already used during the colonial period and the Belle Époque.^[4]

Contents [hide] 1 Overview 2 Huntington's "major civilizations" 3 Huntington's thesis of civilizational clash 3.1 Core state and fault line conflicts 4 Modernization, westernization, and "torn countries" 5 Criticism 5.1 Opposing concepts 5.1.1 The Intermediate Region 6 See also 7 Bibliography 8 References 9 External links

Overview

Huntington began his thinking by surveying the diverse theories about the nature of global politics in the post-Cold War period. Some theorists and writers argued that human rights, liberal democracy and capitalist free market economy had become the only remaining ideological alternative for nations in the post-Cold War world. Specifically, Francis Fukuyama argued that the world had reached the 'end of history' in a Hegelian sense.

Huntington believed that while the age of ideology had ended, the world had only reverted to a normal state of affairs characterized by cultural conflict. In his thesis, he argued that the primary axis of conflict in the future will be along cultural and religious lines.

As an extension, he posits that the concept of different civilizations, as the highest rank of cultural identity, will become increasingly useful in analyzing the potential for conflict.

In the 1993 Foreign Affairs article, Huntington writes:

It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future.^[2]

In the end of the article, he writes:

This is not to advocate the desirability of conflicts between civilizations. It is to set forth descriptive hypothesis as to what the future may be like.^[2]

Huntington's "major civilizations"

The clash of civilizations according to Huntington (1996), as presented in the book. The author states that, instead of belonging to one of the "major" civilizations, Ethiopia and Haiti are "Lone" countries, and that Israel could be considered a unique state with its own civilization, but one which is extremely similar to the West. Huntington also believes that the Anglophone Caribbean, former British colonies in the Caribbean, constitutes a distinct entity.^[5]

Huntington divided the world into the "major civilizations" in his thesis as such:

• Western civilization, centered on Australasia, Northern America, and Europe (excluding Orthodox Eastern and South-Eastern Europe but including Catholic Central and East-Central Europe). Huntington also includes the rest of Oceania. Whether Latin America and the former member states of the Soviet Union are included, or are instead their own separate civilizations, will be an important future consideration for those regions, according to Huntington.
• Latin America. Includes Central America (excluding Belize^{[citation needed]}), South America (excluding the Guianas), Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and Mexico. May be considered a part of Western civilization, though it has slightly distinct social and political structures from Europe and Northern America. Many people of the Southern Cone, however, regard themselves as full members of the Western civilization.
• The Orthodox world of the former Soviet Union (excluding the Baltic states, most of Central Asia and Azerbaijan), the former Yugoslavia (excluding Slovenia and Croatia), Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece, and Romania.
• The Eastern world is the mix of the Buddhist, Sinic, Hindu, and Japonic civilizations.
  • The Buddhist areas of Bhutan, Cambodia, Laos, Mongolia, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and Thailand are identified as separate from other civilizations, but Huntington believes that they do not constitute a major civilization in the sense of international affairs.
  • The Sinic civilization of China, the Koreas, Singapore, Taiwan, and Vietnam. This group also includes the Chinese diaspora, especially in relation to Southeast Asia.
  • Hindu civilization, located chiefly in India, Bhutan and Nepal, and culturally adhered to by the global Indian diaspora.
  • Japan, considered a hybrid of Chinese civilization and older Altaic patterns.
• The Muslim world of the Greater Middle East (excluding Armenia, Cyprus, Ethiopia, Georgia, Greece, Israel, Kazakhstan, Malta, and Sudan), northern West Africa, Albania, Bangladesh, Brunei, Comoros, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Maldives.
• The civilization of Sub-Saharan Africa located in Southern Africa, Middle Africa (excluding Chad), East Africa (excluding the Horn of Africa, Comoros, Kenya, Mauritius, and Tanzania), Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. Considered as a possible 8th civilization by Huntington.
• Instead of belonging to one of the "major" civilizations, Ethiopia and Haiti are labeled as "Lone" countries. Israel could be considered a unique state with its own civilization, Huntington writes, but one which is extremely similar to the West. Huntington also believes that the Anglophone Caribbean, former British colonies in the Caribbean, constitutes a distinct entity.
• There are also others which are considered "cleft countries" because they contain large groups of people identifying with separate civilizations. Examples include India ("cleft" between its Hindu majority and large Muslim minority), Ukraine ("cleft" between its Eastern Rite Catholic-dominated western section and its Orthodox-dominated east), France (cleft between Sub-Saharan African, in the case of French Guiana; and the West), Benin, Chad, Kenya, Nigeria, Tanzania, and Togo (all cleft between Islam and Sub-Saharan Africa), Guyana and Suriname (cleft between Hindu and Sub-Saharan African), China (cleft between Sinic, Buddhist, in the case of Tibet; and the West, in the case of Hong Kong and Macau), and the Philippines (cleft between Islam, in the case of Mindanao; Sinic, and the West). Sudan was also included as "cleft" between Islam and Sub-Saharan Africa; this division is set to become a formal split in July 2011 following an overwhelming vote for independence by Southern Sudan in a January 2011 referendum.

Huntington's thesis of civilizational clash

Emerging alignments as predicted by Huntington in 1996. Thicker lines represent more conflictual relationships.

Huntington argues that the trends of global conflict after the end of the Cold War are increasingly appearing at these civilizational divisions. Wars such as those following the break up of Yugoslavia, in Chechnya, and between India and Pakistan were cited as evidence of inter-civilizational conflict.

Huntington also argues that the widespread Western belief in the universality of the West's values and political systems is naïve and that continued insistence on democratization and such "universal" norms will only further antagonize other civilizations. Huntington sees the West as reluctant to accept this because it built the international system, wrote its laws, and gave it substance in the form of the United Nations.

Huntington identifies a major shift of economic, military, and political power from the West to the other civilizations of the world, most significantly to what he identifies as the two "challenger civilizations", Sinic and Islam.

In Huntington's view, East Asian Sinic civilization is culturally asserting itself and its values relative to the West due to its rapid economic growth. Specifically, he believes that China's goals are to reassert itself as the regional hegemon, and that other countries in the region will 'bandwagon' with China due to the history of hierarchical command structures implicit in the Confucian Sinic civilization, as opposed to the individualism and pluralism valued in the West.

In other words, regional powers such as the two Koreas and Vietnam will acquiesce to Chinese demands and become more supportive of China rather than attempting to oppose it. Huntington therefore believes that the rise of China poses one of the most significant problems and the most powerful long-term threat to the West, as Chinese cultural assertion clashes with the American desire for the lack of a regional hegemony in East Asia.^{[citation needed]}

Huntington argues that the Islamic civilization has experienced a massive population explosion which is fueling instability both on the borders of Islam and in its interior, where fundamentalist movements are becoming increasingly popular. Manifestations of what he terms the "Islamic Resurgence" include the 1979 Iranian revolution and the first Gulf War.

Perhaps the most controversial statement Huntington made in the Foreign Affairs article was that "Islam has bloody borders". Huntington believes this to be a real consequence of several factors, including the previously mentioned Muslim youth bulge and population growth and Islamic proximity to many civilizations including Sinic, Orthodox, Western, and African.

Huntington sees Islamic civilization as a potential ally to China, both having more revisionist goals and sharing common conflicts with other civilizations, especially the West. Specifically, he identifies common Chinese and Islamic interests in the areas of weapons proliferation, human rights, and democracy that conflict with those of the West, and feels that these are areas in which the two civilizations will cooperate.

Russia, Japan, and India are what Huntington terms 'swing civilizations' and may favor either side. Russia, for example, clashes with the many Muslim ethnic groups on its southern border (such as Chechnya) but—according to Huntington—cooperates with Iran to avoid further Muslim-Orthodox violence in Southern Russia, and to help continue the flow of oil. Huntington argues that a "Sino-Islamic connection" is emerging in which China will cooperate more closely with Iran, Pakistan, and other states to augment its international position.

Huntington also argues that civilizational conflicts are "particularly prevalent between Muslims and non-Muslims", identifying the "bloody borders" between Islamic and non-Islamic civilizations. This conflict dates back as far as the initial thrust of Islam into Europe,^{[citation needed]} its eventual expulsion in the Iberian reconquest, the attacks of the Ottoman Turks on Eastern Europe and Vienna, and the European imperial division of the Islamic nations in the 1800s and 1900s.

Huntington also believes that some of the factors contributing to this conflict are that both Christianity (upon which Western civilization is based) and Islam are:

• Missionary religions, seeking conversion of others
• Universal, "all-or-nothing" religions, in the sense that it is believed by both sides that only their faith is the correct one
• Teleological religions, that is, that their values and beliefs represent the goals of existence and purpose in human existence.

More recent factors contributing to a Western-Islamic clash, Huntington wrote, are the Islamic Resurgence and demographic explosion in Islam, coupled with the values of Western universalism - that is, the view that all civilizations should adopt Western values - that infuriate Islamic fundamentalists. All these historical and modern factors combined, Huntington wrote briefly in his Foreign Affairs article and in much more detail in his 1996 book, would lead to a bloody clash between the Islamic and Western civilizations. The political party Hizb ut-Tahrir also reiterate Huntington's views in their published book, "The Inevitability of Clash of Civilisation". ^[6]

Core state and fault line conflicts

In Huntington's view, intercivilizational conflict manifests itself in two forms: fault line conflicts and core state conflicts.

Fault line conflicts are on a local level and occur between adjacent states belonging to different civilizations or within states that are home to populations from different civilizations.

Core state conflicts are on a global level between the major states of different civilizations. Core state conflicts can arise out of fault line conflicts when core states become involved.^[7]

These conflicts may result from a number of causes, such as: relative influence or power (military or economic), discrimination against people from a different civilization, intervention to protect kinsmen in a different civilization, or different values and culture, particularly when one civilization attempts to impose its values on people of a different civilization.^[7]

Modernization, westernization, and "torn countries"

Critics of Huntington's ideas often extend their criticisms to traditional cultures and internal reformers who wish to modernize without adopting the values and attitudes of Western culture. These critics^[who?] sometimes claim that to modernize is necessarily to become Westernized to a very large extent.

In reply, those^[who?] who consider the Clash of Civilizations thesis accurate often point to the example of Japan, claiming that it is not a Western state at its core. They argue that it adopted much Western technology (also inventing technology of its own in recent times), parliamentary democracy, and free enterprise, but has remained culturally very distinct from the West.^{[citation needed]}

China is also cited by some^[who?] as a rising non-Western economy. Many^[who?] also point out the East Asian Tigers or neighboring states as having adapted western economics, while maintaining traditional or authoritarian social government.

Perhaps the ultimate example of non-Western modernization is Russia, the core state of the Orthodox civilization. The variant of this argument that uses Russia as an example relies on the acceptance of a unique non-Western civilization headed by an Orthodox state such as Russia or perhaps an Eastern European country.^{[citation needed]}

Huntington argues that Russia is primarily a non-Western state although he seems to agree that it shares a considerable amount of cultural ancestry with the modern West. Russia was one of the great powers during World War I. It also happened to be a non-Western power.

According to Huntington, the West is distinguished from Orthodox Christian countries by the experience of the Renaissance, Reformation, the Enlightenment, overseas colonialism rather than contiguous expansion and colonialism, and a recent re-infusion of Classical culture through Rome rather than through the continuous trajectory of the Byzantine Empire.

The differences among the modern Slavic states can still be seen today. This issue is also linked to the "universalizing factor" exhibited in some civilizations^{[clarification needed]}.

Huntington refers to countries that are seeking to affiliate with another civilization as "torn countries." Turkey, whose political leadership has systematically tried to Westernize the country since the 1920s, is his chief example.

Turkey's history, culture, and traditions are derived from Islamic civilization, but Turkey's Caucasian elite^[who?] imposed western institutions and dress, embraced the Latin alphabet, joined NATO, and is seeking to join the European Union. Mexico and Russia are also considered to be torn by Huntington. He also gives the example of Australia as a country torn between its Western civilizational heritage and its growing economic engagement with Asia.

According to Huntington, a torn country must meet three requirements to redefine its civilizational identity. Its political and economic elite must support the move. Second, the public must be willing to accept the redefinition. Third, the elites of the civilization that the torn country is trying to join must accept the country.

As noted in the book, to date no torn country has successfully redefined its civilizational identity, this mostly due to the elites of the 'host' civilization refusing to accept the torn country, though if Turkey gained membership of the European Union it has been noted that many of its people would support Westernization^[who?]. If this were to happen it would be the first to redefine its civilizational identity.

Criticism

Huntington has fallen under the stern critique of various academic writers, who have either empirically, historically, logically or ideologically refuted his claims (Fox, 2005; Mungiu Pippidi & Mindruta, 2002; Henderson & Tucker, 2001; Russett, Oneal, & Cox, 2000).^{[8][9][10][11]}

Other books, written for the general public, similarly challenge Huntington's contentious claims. For example, in his work Identity and Violence: The illusion of destiny, The Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen advances several critiques of Huntington's main concept of an inevitable clash along civilizational lines. He argues that violence occurs when individuals see each other as having a singular affiliation (e.g., Hindu, Muslim, Christian), as opposed to multiple affiliations: e.g., Hindu, woman, housewife, mother, artist, daughter, member of a particular socio-economic class etc. In this sense, and to the detriment of civilization distinctiveness, it is argued that all of these dimensions can, and should be a source of a personal identity.^[12]

In another article explicitly referring to Huntington, the same Amartya Sen (1999) points to the fact that "diversity is a feature of most cultures in the world. Western civilization is no exception. The practice of democracy that has won out in the modern West is largely a result of a consensus that has emerged since the Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution, and particularly in the last century or so. To read in this a historical commitment of the West — over the millennia — to democracy, and then to contrast it with non-Western traditions (treating each as monolithic) would be a great mistake" (p. 16).^[13]

In his Terror and Liberalism, Paul Berman proposes another criticism of the civilization clash hypothesis. According to Berman, distinct cultural boundaries do not exist in the present day. He argues there is no "Islamic civilization" nor a "Western civilization", and that the evidence for a civilization clash is not convincing, especially when considering relationships such as that between the United States and Saudi Arabia. In addition, he cites the fact that many Islamic extremists spent a significant amount of time living and/or studying in the Western world. According to Berman, conflict arises because of philosophical beliefs various groups share (or do not share), regardless of cultural or religious identity.^[14]

Edward Said issued a response to Huntington's thesis in his "The Clash of Ignorance".^[15] Said argues that Huntington's categorization of the world's fixed "civilizations" omits the dynamic interdependency and interaction of culture. A long time critic of the Huntingtonian paradigm, and an outspoken proponent of Arab issues, Edward Said (2004) also claimed that not only is the Clash of Civilisations thesis a "reductive and vulgar notion" (p. 226), but it is also an illustration “of the purest invidious racism, a sort of parody of Hitlerian science directed today against Arabs and Muslims” (p. 293). ^[16]

Especially under Said's critique fell Huntington's view of 'Islam' as a monolithical entity:

"My concern […] is that the mere use of the label «Islam», either to explain or indiscriminately condemn «Islam», actually ends up becoming a form of attack […] «Islam» defines a relatively small proportion of what actually takes place in the Islamic world, which numbers a billion people, and includes dozens of countries, societies, traditions, languages and, of course, an infinite number of different experiences. It is simply false to try to trace all this back to something called «Islam», no matter how vociferously polemical Orientalists […] insisted that Islam regulates Islamic societies from top to bottom, that dar al Islam is a single, coherent entity, that church and state are really one in Islam, and so forth." (Said, 1997, p. xvi)

As early as the 1970's, scholars such as Abu Zahra argued that Islam vastly varies contextually and historically. Sections from the Koran that assert equality for men and women have been pointed out and warnings have been issued regarding the very significant gaps that may (and do) exist between erudite, theologically nuanced readings of the Koran on one hand, and widely held popular views and practices on the other. Embracing an already problematic "bulk" of Islam as an explanation for social and cultural phenomena might not only prove unproductive, but is arguably a flawed course of reasoning, since it ignores or neglects specific state policies and interventions (Zahra, 1970, cited in Goddard, Llobera & Shore, 1994, p. 66) ^[17]

Fundamental questions such as what Islam means for Muslims themselves in the modern world are equally "an issue for debate and action in the context of the politics of nation states, the struggle for energy supplies, superpower rivalry, and dependency. What is the «umma», the Islamic community, and how and where is «ijma», or consensus to be formed?" (Gilsenan, 1982, cited in Lukens Bull, 1999, p. 15). ^[18]

Similar anti-Huntingtonian arguments have been woven around the term 'fundamentalism', a "slippery concept […], and word that has come to be associated almost automatically with Islam, although it has a flourishing, usually elided, relationship with Christianity, Judaism and Hinduism" (Said, 1997, p. xvi). ^[19] It has been suggested that "the deliberately created associations between Islam and fundamentalism ensure that the average reader comes to see Islam and fundamentalism as essentially the same thing" (idem). Indeed, Muslim countries such as Indonesia and Tunisia hardly fit into Huntington's fierce Weltanschauung, while his prediction that Turkey might decide to follow some sort of imperial past becomes less plausible by the day, as even newly elected "Islamic" Turkish conservative leaders turn towards Brussels, and not Tashkent, when contemplating foreign affairs.

Opposing concepts

In recent years, the theory of Dialogue Among Civilizations, a response to Huntington's Clash of Civilizations, has become the center of some international attention. The concept, which was introduced by former Iranian president Mohammad Khatami, was the basis for United Nations' resolution to name the year 2001 as the Year of Dialogue among Civilizations.^[20][21]

The Alliance of Civilizations (AOC) initiative was proposed at the 59th General Assembly of the United Nations in 2005 by the President of the Spanish Government, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero and co-sponsored by the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The initiative is intended to galvanize collective action across diverse societies to combat extremism, to overcome cultural and social barriers between mainly the Western and predominantly Muslim worlds, and to reduce the tensions and polarization between societies which differ in religious and cultural values.

The Intermediate Region

Huntington's geopolitical model, especially the structures for North Africa and Eurasia, is largely derived from the "Intermediate Region" geopolitical model first formulated by Dimitri Kitsikis and published in 1978.^[22] The Intermediate Region, which spans the Adriatic Sea and the Indus River, is neither western nor eastern (at least, with respect to the Far East) but is considered distinct.

Concerning this region, Huntington departs from Kitsikis contending that a civilizational fault line exists between the two dominant yet differing religions (Orthodox Christianity and Sunni Islam), hence a dynamic of external conflict. However, Kitsikis establishes an integrated civilization comprising these two peoples along with those belonging to the less dominant religions of Shiite Islam, Alevism and Judaism. They have a set of mutual cultural, social, economic and political views and norms which radically differ from those in the West and the Far East.

In the Intermediate Region, therefore, one cannot speak of a civiliational clash or external conflict, but rather an internal conflict, not for cultural domination, but for political succession. This has been successfully demonstrated by documenting the rise of Christianity from the hellenized Roman Empire, the rise of the Islamic caliphates from the Christianized Roman Empire and the rise of Ottoman rule from the Islamic caliphates and the Christianized Roman Empire.

See also

• Balkanization
• Civilizing mission
• Cultural relativism
• Criticism of multiculturalism
• Fault line war
• Partition of India
• Protracted social conflict
• Religious pluralism

Individuals

• Jacob Burckhardt
• Niall Ferguson, Professor of History at Harvard University
• Thomas Barnett (geostrategist)
• Carroll Quigley

Authors and books

• Francis Fukuyama, American political economist and author of The End of History and the Last Man
• Oswald Spengler's The Decline of the West
• Emmanuel Todd's After the Empire: The Breakdown of the American Order
• Arnold J. Toynbee's A Study of History
• The West's Last Chance: Will We Win the Clash of Civilizations?

Bibliography

• Ankerl, Guy. Global communication without universal civilization. INU societal research. Vol.1: Coexisting contemporary civilizations: Arabo-Muslim, Bharati, Chinese, and Western. Geneva: INU Press. ISBN 2-88155-004-5.
• Barbé, Philippe, "L'Anti-Choc des Civilisations: Méditations Méditerranéennes", Editions de l'Aube, 2006, ISBN 9782752602084
• Barber, Benjamin R., Jihad vs. McWorld, Hardcover: Crown, 1995, ISBN 0812923502; Paperback: Ballantine Books, 1996, ISBN 0345383044
• Blankley, Tony, The West's Last Chance: Will We Win the Clash of Civilizations?, Washington, D.C., Regnery Publishing, Inc., 2005 ISBN 0-89526-015-8
• Harris, Lee, Civilization and Its Enemies: The Next Stage of History, New York, The Free Press, 2004 ISBN 0-7432-5749-9
• Harrison, Lawrence E. and Samuel P. Huntington (eds.), Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress, New York, Basic Books, 2001 ISBN 0-465-03176-5
• Huntington, Samuel P., The Clash of Civilizations?, in "Foreign Affairs", vol. 72, no. 3, Summer 1993, pp. 22–49
• Huntington, Samuel P., The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, New York, Simon & Schuster, 1996 ISBN 0-684-84441-9
• Huntington, Samuel P. (ed.), The Clash of Civilizations?: The Debate, New York, Foreign Affairs, 1996 ISBN 0-87609-164-8
• Kepel, Gilles, Bad Moon Rising: a chronicle of the Middle East today, London, Saqi Books, 2003 ISBN 0-863-56303-1
• Köchler, Hans (ed.), Civilizations: Conflict or Dialogue?, Vienna, International Progress Organization, 1999 ISBN 3-900704-18-X (Google Print)
• Köchler, Hans, The "Clash of Civilizations": Perception and Reality in the Context of Globalization and International Power Politics, Tbilisi (Georgia), 2004
• Pera, Marcello and Joseph Ratzinger (Pope Benedict XVI), Senza radici: Europa, Relativismo, Cristianesimo, Islam [transl.: Without Roots: The West, Relativism, Christianity, Islam, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, Perseus Books Group, 2006 ISBN 0-465-00634-5], Milano, Mondadori, 2004 ISBN 88-04-54474-0
• Peters, Ralph, Fighting for the Future: Will America Triumph?, Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania, Stackpole Books, 1999 ISBN 0-8117-0651-6
• Sacks, Jonathan, The Dignity of Difference: How to Avoid the Clash of Civilizations, London, Continuum, 2002 ISBN 0-826-46397-5
• Toft, Monica Duffy, The Geography of Ethnic Violence: Identity, Interests, and the Indivisibility of Territory, Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 2003 ISBN 0-691-11354-8
• Tusicisny, Andrej, Civilizational Conflicts: More Frequent, Longer, and Bloodier?, in "Journal of Peace Research", vol. 41, no. 4, 2004, pp. 485–498 (available online)
• Van Creveld, Martin, The Transformation of War, New York & London, The Free Press, 1991 ISBN 0-02-933155-2
• Venn, Couze "Clash of Civilisations", in Prem Poddar et al , Historical Companion to Postcolonial Literatures--Continental Europe and its Empires, Edinburgh University Press, 2008.

References

1. ^ http://www.aei.org/issue/29196
2. ^ ^{a b c} Official copy (free preview): The Clash of Civilizations?, Foreign Affairs, Summer 1993
3. ^ Bernard Lewis: The Roots of Muslim Rage The Atlantic Monthly, September 1990
4. ^ Louis Massignon, La psychologie musulmane (1931), in Idem, Ecrits mémorables, t. I, Paris, Robert Laffont, 2009, p. 629: "Après la venue de Bonaparte au Caire, le clash of cultures entre l'ancienne Chrétienté et l'Islam prit un nouvel aspect, par invasion (sans échange) de l'échelle de valeurs occidentales dans la mentalité collective musulmane".
5. ^ THE WORLD OF CIVILIZATIONS: POST-1990 scanned image
6. ^ The Inevitability of Clash of Civilisation
7. ^ ^{a b} Huntington, Samuel P. (2002) [1997]. "Chapter 9: The Global Politics of Civilizations". The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (The Free Press ed.). London: Simon $ Schuster. p. 207f. ISBN 0-7432-3149-X.
8. ^ Fox, J. (2005). Paradigm Lost: Huntington's Unfulfilled Clash of Civilizations Prediction into the 21st Century. International Politics, 42, pp. 428-457.
9. ^ Mungiu-Pippidi, A., & Mindruta, D. (2002). Was Huntington Right? Testing Cultural Legacies and the Civilization Border. International Politics, 39(2), pp. 193 213.
10. ^ Henderson, E. A., & Tucker, R. (2001). Clear and Present Strangers: The Clash of Civilizations and International Conflict. International Studies Quarterly, 45, pp. 317 338.
11. ^ Russett, B. M., Oneal, J. R., & Cox, M. (2000). Clash of Civilizations, or Realism and Liberalism Déjà Vu? Some Evidence. Journal of Peace Research, 37, pp. 583 608.
12. ^ Sen, Amartya (2006). Identity and Violence. New York: W.W. Norton.
13. ^ Sen A (1999). "Democracy as a Universal Value". Journal of Democracy 10 (3): 3-17.
14. ^ Berman, Paul (2003). Terror and Liberalism. W W Norton & Company. ISBN 0-393-05775-5.
15. ^ Edward Said: The Clash of Ignorance The Nation, October 2001
16. ^ Said, E. W. (2004). From Oslo to Iraq and the Road Map. New York: Pantheon, 2004.
17. ^ Goddard, V., Llobera, J., & Shore, C. (1994). The Anthropology of Europe: Identity and Boundaries in Conflict. Oxford: Berg.
18. ^ Lukens Bull, R. (1999). Between Text and Practice: Considerations in the Anthropological Study of Islam. Marburg Journal of Religion: 4(2) (electronic version).
19. ^ Said, E. W. (1997). Covering Islam. How the Media and the Experts Detemine How We See the Rest of the World (Fully rev. ed.), New York: Vintage Books.
20. ^ http://www.unesco.org/dialogue2001/en/khatami.htm Unesco.org Retrieved on 05-24-07
21. ^ http://www.dialoguecentre.org/about.html Dialoguecentre.org Retrieved on 05-24-07
22. ^ Dimitri Kitsikis, A Comparative History of Greece and Turkey in the 20th century. In Greek, Συγκριτική Ἱστορία Ἑλλάδος καί Τουρκίας στόν 20ό αἰῶνα, Athens, Hestia, 1978. Supplemented 2nd edition: Hestia, 1990. 3rd edition: Hestia, 1998, 357 pp.. In Turkish, Yırmı Asırda Karşılaştırmalı Türk-Yunan Tarihi, İstanbul, Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları Dergisi, II-8, 1980.